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INTRODUCTION

Employment discrimination law is riddled with doctrines that tell courts
to believe employers and not workers. Judges often use these disbelief
doctrines to dismiss cases at the summary judgment stage. 1 At times, judges
even use them after a jury trial to justify nullifying jury verdicts in favor of
workers. 2
This article brings together many disparate discrimination doctrines and
shows how they function as disbelief doctrines, causing courts to believe
employers and not workers. The strongest disbelief doctrines include the
stray comments doctrine, the same decisionmaker inference, and the same
protected class inference. However, these are not the only ones. Even
doctrines that facially appear to perform other functions often serve as
disbelief doctrines. Courts often rely on the honest belief doctrine and the
idea that courts do not sit as super-personnel departments to impermissibly
favor an employer's evidence over that presented by the worker. And even
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38NPI WJ62

t Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. This
article relies on initial research about discrimination doctrine reflected in SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A.
THOMAS, UNEQUAL: How AMERICA 's COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRJMINA TION LA w (2017).
I . See infra Part I.
2.

See infra Part I.
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outside of the more formalized doctrines, courts often apply evidentiary
preferences that disfavor workers by excluding relevant evidence.
Although many of these doctrines have received scholarly criticism and
attention, 3 this article examines how the various disbelief doctrines work
together to tilt employment discrimination jurisprudence to favor employers
over workers. When plaintiffs try to survive summary judgment or maintain
a jury verdict in their favor, the disbelief doctrines often improperly instruct
courts not to believe them. While the disbelief doctrines are problematic
because they rely on faulty factual premises, they are also worrisome because
of three underlying structural problems.
First, the disbelief doctrines upend the normal rules of litigation. In
individual cases where trial courts apply the disbelief doctrines, judges are
often violating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure related to summary
judgment or post-trial motions. 4 And appellate courts often disregard rules
designed to respect jury verdicts. 5
Second, it is unclear whether judges even possess the power to create
the doctrines in the first place. Each of the doctrines discussed is a courtcreated doctrine not contained within the text of the federal discrimination
statutes. Many of the doctrines have no statutory basis and even contradict
Supreme Court precedent. It is questionable whether the courts have valid
power to create facially substantive rules outside of a statutory regime that
act as disbelief doctrines, thus contradicting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Finally, the disbelief doctrines are part of a much larger development in
federal discrimination jurisprudence. When a court examines a federal
discrimination case at a procedural juncture such as summary judgment, the
judge follows a different set of analytical constructs than those used if the
same case was given to a jury. For example, under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a judge may allow a case to proceed past summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. However, judges and juries approach discrimination cases
very differently, making it difficult to understand how a judge can reasonably
approximate a jury's analysis. Not only are judges demographically different
than juries, but, as discussed later in detail, judges use different analytical
frameworks than juries to consider cases. As a result, judges and juries may
not arrive at the same answers because they are asking different questions.

3. See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in
Employment Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. REV. 149 (2012); Natasha T. Martin, immunity for Hire:
How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 1117, 1135 (2008).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), 56(a).
5. See, e.g., Smith v. Heritage Ranch Owners Ass'n, 655 F. App'x 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2016).
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This article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the disbelief doctrines.
Part III demonstrates how these doctrines violate the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and appellate norms designed to preserve the function of the jury.
Part IV discusses structural problems with the disbelief doctrines, focusing
on how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure substantively limit a court's
ability to create doctrines that tell judges to favor one party over another.
I.
THE DISBELIEF DOCTRINES

This section describes the disbelief doctrines: (1) the stray remarks
doctrine; (2) the same protected class inference; (3) the same decisionmaker
inference; (4) the honest belief doctrine; and (5) the idea that the courts do
not sit as super-personnel departments.
A. Stray Remarks

The stray remarks doctrine is a court-created doctrine that allows courts
to declare that certain discriminatory remarks are not relevant to an
underlying claim of discrimination. Some examples are helpful. In a race
discrimination case, a worker presented evidence that his supervisor referred
to African-Americans as "lazy," "worthless," and "just here to get paid." 6
The judge refused to consider these comments as supporting the plaintiff's
claim that he was fired because of his race, reasoning that they were stray
remarks not probative of race discrimination. 7 In an age discrimination case,
a court similarly rejected a claim where the worker presented evidence that
his supervisor told him "you are too damn old for this kind of work" two
weeks before he was fired. 8 As further explored below, judges commonly
invoke the stray remarks doctrine to exclude evidence presented by workers,
allowing the court to grant summary judgment or other motions in favor of
the employer. 9
The stray remarks doctrine is not contained within the text of any of the
main federal discrimination statutes. Instead, the stray remarks doctrine is a
special evidentiary rule that courts created and apply in discrimination cases.
Through this doctrine, judges can refuse to consider discriminatory
comments in the workplace if the court deems the comments too remote in
time from the contested decision, not made in the context of the decision, or

6. Chappell v. The Bilco Co., 2011 WL 9037, at *9 (E.D. Ark. 2011), a.ffd sub nom. Chappell v.
Sileo Co., 675 F.3d 1110 (8th Cir. 2012) (granting summary judgment).
7.

Id.

8. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 551 (4th Cir. 1995) (Butzner, J.,
dissenting), rev "d, 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
9. See Stone, supra note 3 (more examples of the stray remarks doctrine).
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too ambiguous to show discriminatory bias. 10 The stray remarks doctrine first
appeared in a concurring opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in the
1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 11 In that case, Justice O'Connor
noted:
Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual
harassment, cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or
promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the
decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden in this
regard .... 12

Importantly, Justice O'Connor's discussion of stray remarks did not rely on
or even purport to draw from the statutory language of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), its legislative history, or its purpose. Nor
was Justice O'Connor claiming that the purported stray remarks were not
relevant in intentional discrimination cases. Rather, she was making a narrow
claim related to the specific issue raised in Price Waterhouse about whether
a plaintiff could proceed under a mixed-motive framework without what she
called "direct evidence" of discrimination. 13
While her remarks were part of a concurring opinion and are not
controlling law, courts have expanded on the idea. As Professor Kerri Lynn
Stone has noted, after Price Waterhouse, "the so-called stray comments
doctrine . . . had a groundswell of usage, building in popularity year after
year." 14 The stray remarks doctrine has been used in a wide range of cases to
exclude comments from which one could infer bias. Most often, courts use it
at the summary judgment stage. When the judge grants summary judgment
in favor of the employer, it often explains away evidence presented by the
plaintiff by characterizing it as a stray remark. For example, in a sex
discrimination case, a judge found that a supervisor's references to female
workers-and to the plaintiff in particular-as "bitch," "cunt," "whore,"
"slut," and "tart" were stray remarks and not evidence of sex discrimination. 15
In age discrimination cases, courts have used the stray remarks doctrine to

IO.
See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 716 (7th Cir. 2013); Mosberger v. CPG Nutrients,
2002 WL 314 77292, at •7 (W.D. Pa. 2002) ("Discriminatory stray remarks are generally considered in
one of three categories-those made (I) by a non-decisionmaker; (2) by a decisionmaker but unrelated to
the decision process; or (3) by a decisionmaker but temporally remote from the adverse employment
decision.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also generally Stone, supra note 3.
11.
490 U.S. 228, 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
12.
Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63--69 (1976)).
13.
Id. at 270-71.
14.
Stone, supra note 3, at 170.
15.
Ferrand v. Credit Lyonnais, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2003), affd, 110 F. App'x 160 (2d Cir.
2004).
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exclude evidence that managers wanted to hire "young blood," 16 when a
supervisor referred to an employee as an "old and ugly woman, 17 and when
co-workers described plaintiff as an "old man," "old fart," "old son of a
bitch," and "fat old bastard." 18
Like many of the doctrines discussed in this article, in limited
circumstances it may be appropriate for a judge to use the underlying
intuition of the stray remarks doctrine to rule in the employer's favor. If there
is no possible way that any reasonable juror could infer discrimination from
a comment and there is no other evidence suggesting discrimination, the
worker's case should not be allowed to proceed. 19 However, this is not
because of any special function of the stray remarks doctrine. Rather, the
worker simply has no evidence of discrimination. The federal courts do not
need to rely on any special, discrimination-specific rule to find for the
employer in such a case. Unfortunately, when judges invoke the stray
remarks doctrine, the allegedly stray remarks are often ones that a jury might
credibly use (especially along with other evidence) to find in favor of the
worker.
Courts do not uniformly apply the stray remarks doctrine and some
judges have criticized it. 20 Strangely, the Supreme Court has decided
numerous cases where it has at least implicitly rejected the stray remarks
doctrine, yet the doctrine has continued vitality in the lower courts. For
example, in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,21 the lower courts nullified a jury's
verdict in favor of two men who claimed the employer refused to promote
them because of their race. The men presented evidence that the plant
manager, who made the promotion decision, referred to each of them as
"boy." 22 Although a jury found race discrimination, the trial court judge, on
a post-trial motion, ruled that the supervisor's use of the word "boy" was not
racial in nature. 23 Affirming, the appellate court also found that the use of the
word "boy" was not evidence of discrimination. 24 The Supreme Court

16.
Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the trial court
granted judgment as a matter oflaw even in light of the "young blood" remark because "(t]he district court
held that there was simply no probative evidence that age was a determinative factor in the decision to
terminate Price").
17. Engstrand v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'!, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1390, 1399 (S.D. Iowa 1996), ajf'd, 112
F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 1997).
18. Harrison v. Formosa Plastics Corp. Tex., 776 F. Supp. 2d 433,442 (S.D. Tex.2011).
19. See FED. R. Clv. P. 56(a).
20.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Marriott Corp., 83 I F. Supp. 691, 704 (S.D. Iowa 1993) ("There appears
to be no unified test for determining whether certain statements fall within the stray remarks doctrine.").
21. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 455-56 (2006).
22. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2004 WL 5138005, at *1, *6 (N.D. Ala. 2004), aff'd in part, rev 'd
in part, 129 F. App'x 529 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 546 U.S. 454 (2006).
23.
id.
24. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App'x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 546 U.S. 454
(2006).
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reversed the appellate court's decision regarding the use of the word "boy,"
noting that the meaning of the term depended on the context in which it was
used. 25
The Supreme Court also rejected the application of the stray remarks
doctrine in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 26 In that case, Roger
Reeves alleged that his employer fired him because of his age.27 At the time
he was fired, Mr. Reeves had worked for Sanderson Plumbing for 40 years
and was 57 years old. 28 To support his discrimination claim, Mr. Reeves
presented evidence at trial that a supervisor who was involved in his
termination told Mr. Reeves several months before his dismissal that he was
so old that he "must have come over on the Mayflower" and that he was "too
damn old to do the job." 29
Not only did the jury find in Mr. Reeves's favor, it also found that the
employer's conduct was willful. Reviewing the jury's decision, the appellate
court disregarded the age-related comments as stray remarks and rejected the
verdict. It noted, "Despite the potentially damning nature of [the] age-related
comments, it is clear that these comments were not made in the direct context
of Reeves's termination." 30 The Supreme Court corrected the appellate
court's mistake and found that the jury's verdict should stand. 31 The Supreme
Court reasoned that when a supervisor makes comments that someone is so
old that they must have sailed on the Mayflower, and that a worker is too old
to do his job, the jury is entitled to infer that age played a role in the worker's
termination. 32 Despite both of these Supreme Court cases, the lower courts
still continue to use the stray remarks doctrine to exclude evidence in
employment discrimination cases.
B. The Same Actor and Same Protected Class Inferences
The courts have also created two additional inferences that favor
employers and disfavor workers: the same protected class inference and the
same actor inference. Judges often rely on these inferences when granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The inferences are not
mandatory and are not contained within the statutory language of the federal
discrimination statutes. The same protected class inference presumes that a
person who is in the same protected class as the worker would not

25.
26.

Ash, 546 U.S. at 456.
530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000).
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688,691 (5th Cir. 1999), rev"d, 530 U.S.
133 (2000).
30.
Id. at 693.
31.
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151.
32.
Id.
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discriminate against the worker based on their shared protected trait. For
example, this inference might assume that a person older than 40 years old
will not discriminate against other workers over the age of 40. 33
Similarly, the same actor inference allows a court to assume that if a
supervisor made a positive decision in favor of a worker, the same
supervisor's later negative action against that same worker cannot be
discriminatory. 34 For example, if a supervisor hired an older worker and then
a few years later fires the worker, the court will assume that the supervisor
did not take age into account when firing the worker. As one court reasoned,
"From the standpoint of the putative discriminator, [i]t hardly makes sense to
hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological
costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job." 35
Some courts will apply the same actor inference where there is a short
period of time between the positive decision and the subsequent negative
decision. 36 However, at least one court has applied the doctrine when seven
years elapsed between the positive and negative decision. 37 Courts in every
federal circuit have relied on the same actor inference. 38
Like the stray remarks doctrine, there are numerous Supreme Court
holdings that appear to invalidate both the same protected class and the same
decisionmaker doctrines. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the
Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff could present a claim for samesex sexual harassment. 39 The Court allowed such claims, holding that men
and women can discriminate against their own sex. The Court specifically
noted: "If our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today that
nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of ...
sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged
with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex." 40 Likewise, in
33.
Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651,658 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d
796, 796 (4th Cir. 1991)). There is a long line of cases applying the same protected class inference. See,
e.g., Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991); Cartee v. Wilbur Smith
Assocs., Inc., 2010 WL 5059643, at *5 (D.S.C. 2010); Demesme v. Montgomery Cnty. Gov't, 63 F. Supp.
2d 678,683 (D. Md. 1999); Aminnokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1995).
However, courts also reject the same protected class inference. Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255
F.3d 359,361 (7th Cir. 2001).
34.
See Brown, 82 F.3d at 658.
35.
Id. See also DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that
employer's knowledge of plaintiff's pregnancy when she was hired created an inference that the reason
for her termination was not pretextual).
36.
Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination
in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CoNN. L. REV. 1117, 1135 (2008) (discussing cases).
37.
Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 796-97 (4th Cir. 1991); Martin, supra note 36, at 1135. But see
Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (criticizing use of the doctrine when
there is a long intervening period between the positive decision and the negative one).
38.
Martin, supra note 36, at 1128.
39.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 76 (1998).
40.
Id. at 79.

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

238

Vol. 39:1

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Supreme Court recognized
that the lower court improperly granted judgment in favor of the employer in
an age discrimination case. 41 That case involved decisionmakers who were
age 40 or older and thus belonged to the same protected class as the plaintiff.
However, the Court did not find this fact to be dispositive or even probative
of the underlying legal question.
Although less strong, Supreme Court precedent also casts doubt on the
same decisionmaker doctrine. For example, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, a vice president of a bank hired the plaintiff. 42 In the plaintiff's sexual
harassment case, in which she alleged that the bank vice president sexually
harassed her, the Supreme Court did not draw any inference in favor of the
employer based on the fact that the bank vice president both hired her and
was involved in the decision to terminate her. 43
C.

The Honest Belief Rule

The "honest belief' rule is another disbelief doctrine, at least in some
cases. Under the honest belief doctrine, some courts will not hold an
employer liable for negative actions against on employee based on incorrect
information if the employer honestly believed the information to be true at
the time it made the employment decision. 44 For example, if an employer
fires a worker for three unexcused absences, the employer will not be held
liable for discrimination if it later turns out that the worker did not have three
unexcused absences. Even though the employer was wrong, courts reason,
the basis for the termination was not the worker's protected trait. 45
Like the stray remarks doctrine, the underlying intuition of the honest
belief rule is correct in a limited subset of cases. If the employer truly made
its decision under a faulty set of facts and there is no other evidence
suggesting discrimination, then it would be appropriate for a judge to find in
favor of the employer. Again, courts need not rely on a special employment
discrimination doctrine to reach this outcome. In such a case, the worker has
simply failed to present any evidence that a protected trait played a negative
role in an employment outcome. Like the stray remarks doctrine, though,
courts often use the honest belief rule in cases where the facts are not
straightforward.
Unfortunately, some judges apply the honest belief doctrine in cases
where the worker has evidence showing that when the decision was made,

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153-54 (2000).
42. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (1986).
43. Vinson v. Taylor, 1980 WL 100, at *8 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir.
1985), aff'd and remanded, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
44. Loyd v. St. Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580,590 (6th Cir. 2014).
45. Id. at 590--91.
41.
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the employer did not actually believe the reason it later asserted in court. 46
Courts have also allowed employers to claim that they honestly believed they
fired an employee for violating company policy even when they do not
regularly enforce the policy or when there is evidence that the policy does
not even exist. 47 One worker's case was dismissed on summary judgment
notwithstanding a federal appellate judge calling the employer's factual
investigation "so poor and one-sided as to be 'unworthy of credence. "' 48
Courts have applied the honest belief doctrine to dismiss cases when there
was evidence that the supervisor who complained about an employee's
performance also made racist remarks, 49 and where others involved in the
decision may have known about the supervisor's bias. 50
Judges have also supported a supervisor's reasons for acting, even if the
supervisor is not able to explain why he made a decision. 51 As one court noted
in criticizing the "honest belief' rule, the rule allows employers to "provide
an honest reason for firing the employee, even if that reason had no factual
support." 52 One court has gone so far as to dismiss a case under the honest
belief rule even when the employer changed reasons for its actions. 53
Many honest belief cases seem to contradict Supreme Court precedent. 54
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court held that a worker
may prove discrimination by showing that the reason provided by the
employer for its decision is not true, and rather was a pretext for
discrimination. 55 The Court explained this in detail in Reeves when it noted:
Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one
form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
46.
See Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express, 280 F. App'x 729, 733 (10th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff
presented evidence that employer may have believed time card discrepancies were mistakes, and not
fraudulent).
47.
See, e.g., Hale v. Mercy Health Partners, 2015 WL 1637896, at *10 (6th Cir. 2015) (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority's use grant of summary judgment
where the employer did not adhere strictly to its timekeeping policies but claimed it terminated plaintiff
due to timekeeping violations); Wilson v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 579 F. App'x 392,408 (6th Cir. 2014)
(Cole, CJ., dissenting in part) (criticizing use of honest belief doctrine where employer had not disciplined
nursing assistant for participating in the same act that allegedly caused plaintiff's termination).
48.
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274,290 (6th Cir. 2012) (Tamow, J., dissenting)
(discussing honest belief doctrine in context of the Family and Medical Leave Act, which is similar
analysis to that used in discrimination cases). See also Kariotis v. Navistar lnt'l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d
672, 677 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing employer investigation as "careless").
49.
See Clack v. Rock-Tenn Co., 304 F. App'x 399,403 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008).
50.
See id at 405.
5I. See Walton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 167 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1999).
52.
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998).
53. Bhama v. Mercy Memorial Hosp. Corp., 416 F. App'x 542, 557 (6th Cir. 2011) (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the majority should not have dismissed the plaintiff's claims in light of evidence that
the defendant had changed its justification for not promoting the plaintiff).
54.
See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,511 (1993) (noting that the factfinder's
disbelief of the employer's reason is sufficient to establish discrimination).
55.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,805 (1973).
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discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. ("[P]roving the employer's
reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater
enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination"). In
appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the
falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's
dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." Moreover,
once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may
well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer
is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. 56

In discrimination cases, a jury may find in favor of the plaintiff if it finds
that the employer lied about the reason for its action. 57 The lie is a proper
basis from which the jury may infer discrimination. In many honest belief
cases, the employer gives one reason for its decision, and the worker has
evidence that the reason is not true. Nonetheless, some courts choose to
believe that the employer had an honest belief, rather than finding that the
employer's reason might be a pretext for discrimination. Although some
judges find the rule problematic and others refuse to use it, 58 the honest belief
doctrine is still widely applied.

D. Super-Personnel Department
In summary judgment orders and other similar contexts, federal judges
will often repeat the mantra that they do not sit as super-personnel
departments. 59 There is no problem with this idea in itself. The federal
discrimination statutes are not a fairness code. They do not require employers
to be nice or to treat employees well. Rather, the statutes prohibit certain
conduct because of a protected trait. The super-personnel department concept
is not so much a coherent doctrine, but rather a reason that judges often
supply to exclude or diminish evidence that might also show discrimination
by the employer.
Courts improperly use the super-personnel department justification to
undergird their dismissal decisions in a wide-range of contexts. At times,
judges use this idea to limit a worker's ability to challenge whether the
employer is proffering an accurate reason for its employment decision. Recall

56.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (quoting St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,517 (1993); Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,296 (I 992)).
57. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
58. See, e.g., Dailey v. Accubuilt, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (expressing
concern over the frequency of summary judgment grants based on the honest belief doctrine); Obike v.
Applied EPI, Inc., 2004 WL 741657, at *5 (D. Minn. 2004) (discussing reluctance of some courts to use
doctrine).
59. Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional and
Reverse Discrimination in Title Vil Proof, 46 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1031, 1115-16 (2004).
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that in McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court held that a worker can
establish discrimination at trial by showing that the employer lied about its
reason for acting. 60
In an employment discrimination case, an employer might provide
multiple reasons to counter allegations of discriminatory action. However, a
judge might dismiss a case if a worker shows that some, but not all, of the
employer's reasons are false. 61 If the employer lies about one of the reasons,
this might be pretext for discrimination, yet a judge might use the superpersonnel department doctrine to dismiss these cases. 62 Using this same idea,
the judge might hold that there is no inference of discrimination even when
an employer does not follow its posted job criteria in making hiring or
promotion decisions. 63 The judge may not view her job as requiring
employers to follow their own posted job criteria. However, a judge that
follows this line of reasoning ignores that the failure to follow posted criteria
could mean that the decisionmaker was changing the job criteria to favor
workers of a different race or sex, especially when there is other evidence of
bias.
Some courts refuse to allow a worker to prove that she was the most
qualified person for the position. For a long time, some courts would not
allow a worker to use evidence of her qualifications as evidence of
discrimination unless the worker presented evidence that "the disparity in
qualifications is 'so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you
in the face. "' 64 In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., however, the Supreme Court
rejected this standard, finding that "the visual image of words jumping off
the page to slap you (presumably a court) in the face is unhelpful and
imprecise." 65 The Court noted that a worker can show discrimination by
presenting evidence that the employer chose a less qualified candidate. 66
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
61. DeJamette v. Coming Inc., 133 F.3d 293,299 (4th Cir. 1998) (dismissing case where plaintiff
disproved one of employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for termination by proving that her
packing and inspecting performance was average, but did not disprove other proffered reasons of poor
attitude, lack of enthusiasm, and poor use of slack time).
62.
Wolf v. Buss (Am.) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming grant of summary
judgment for employer despite plaintiff demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact on four of
employer's six proffered reasons for plaintiff's dismissal because these four reasons were not sufficiently
"intertwined" as to create doubt as to final two reasons).
63.
See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2004 WL 5138005, at *I, *6 (N.D. Ala. 2004), ajf'd in
part, rev 'din part, 129 F. App'x 529 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 546 U.S. 454 (2006).
64.
See Bryant v. Dougherty Cnty. Sch. Sys., 2009 WL 3161678, at * 13 (M.D. Ga. 2009) ( quoting
Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001)), ajf'd, 382 F. App'x 914 (I Ith Cir. 2010).
65. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006).
66.
Id. at 458. Despite the Ash decision, lower courts continue to reject evidence that a worker was
better qualified. While courts should not use the "slap you in the face" standard that the Supreme Court
rejected, some courts seem to continue to use a similarly high standard for viewing a worker's evidence.
Compare id. at 457 with Bryant, 2009 WL 3161678, at * 13. Recently, a court stated that evidence that a
worker was better qualified than the chosen applicant constitutes evidence of discrimination only if the
60.
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Nonetheless, after Ash, some courts still make it very difficult for a worker
to prove her case through evidence that she was more qualified for the
position than other applicants. 67
Courts also use the super-personnel department justification to dismiss
cases when the employer accuses the employee of engaging in bad conduct
and the employee has evidence to the contrary. When the worker presents
evidence, through his own testimony or the testimony of co-workers, that the
alleged bad conduct did not occur, judges have asserted that the evidence is
not relevant. 68 Courts have also used the super-personnel department
rationale in holding that an employer's failure to follow its own policies was
not evidence of discrimination. 69 As with many of the disbelief doctrines,
however, courts do not apply the super-personnel department doctrine
uniformly. For example, some courts allow evidence of a company's failure
to follow its own policies to count as evidence of discrimination. 70
II.
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the rules that govern
litigation in federal court. They also express fundamental ideas about how
the judicial process is supposed to operate, two of which are important to this
discussion: Rule 56, which governs summary judgment, and Rule 50, which
governs judgment as a matter of law. Further, on appeal, once a jury rules in
favor of a party, there are important rules that limit appellate judges' abilities
to second-guess the jury on factual questions. Together, these rules provide
powerful limits on federal judges. This section discusses how those rules

differences between candidates "are so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be no dispute among
reasonable persons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at
issue." Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2015 WL 400633, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2015) (quoting Mlynczak
v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1059-60 (7th Cir. 2006)).
67.
See, e.g., Bryant, 2009 WL 3161678, at *13; Carlson, 2015 WL 400633, at *6; Mlynczak, 442
F.3d at 1059-60.
68. See, e.g., DeJarnette v. Corning, 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998); Ramos v. Molina
Healthcare, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 511, 523 (E.D. Va. 2013), affd, 603 F. App'x. 173 (4th Cir. 2015)
(evidence from plaintiff and coworker calling into question claim that plaintiff was belligerent during a
meeting was not tethered to other evidence of age discrimination); Jones v. Polk Ctr., 2009 WL 700686,
at *6 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
69. See, e.g., Ramos, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 526. See also Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2004 WL 5138005,
at *1, *6 (N.D. Ala. 2004), ajf'd in part, rev 'din part, 129 F. App'x 529 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 546
U.S. 454 (2006) (noting that failure to follow written qualifications for job was not evidence of race
discrimination).
70. See, e.g., Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1374 (11th Cir.1985) ("Departures from normal
procedures may be suggestive of discrimination."); Ransdell v. Russ Berrie & Co., Chicago, Inc., 1991
WL 101658, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("[W]here a company has established certain procedures for dealing
with performance problems but does not follow them ... this deviation may support an inference of
pretext.").
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limit a judge's ability to use the disbelief doctrines in individual
circumstances.
The American legal system has a set of fundamental ideals about the
appropriate role of its institutional actors. When a jury is properly requested
for a claim triable by jury, the jury is the factfinder, not the judge. Under the
federal rule governing summary judgment, Rule 56, a claim may be
dismissed only if there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and the
employer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 71 Rule 50, on the other
hand, governs when it is appropriate for a court to grant judgment as a matter
of law in a jury trial. 72 That rule provides that a judge may grant judgment as
a matter of law if there is "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis" for a
reasonable jury to find for the party on a particular issue. 73
Under both of these rules, the judge is not supposed to determine the
credibility of witnesses. In ruling on motions for summary judgment or
motions under Rule 50, the judge is supposed to read all evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. 74 The judge is not allowed to weigh
the quality of the evidence of the moving party against the weight of the
evidence of the non-moving party. 75 Instead, after looking at the evidence as
a whole, the judge is required to "disregard all evidence favorable to the
moving party that the jury is not required to believe." 76 The judge is then
supposed to assume that the facts presented by the non-moving party are true
and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 77
Similar inferences operate at the appellate level after a jury verdict to
ensure that the appellate courts properly defer to the jury. As one court noted,
the appellate court must "give deference to all credibility determinations and
reasonable inferences of the jury, and may not weigh the credibility of
witnesses or otherwise consider the weight of the evidence." 78
The limits placed on a judge's ability to second-guess a jury have a
constitutional and a statutory dimension. The Seventh Amendment of the
Constitution limits how a judge can change the outcome reached by a jury.
Moreover, the federal discrimination statutes explicitly provide workers with
a right to jury trial. 79 Likewise, the procedural rules that govern federal judges

71.

72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000).
See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554 (1990).
See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 135.
See id.
Crawford v. Tribeca Lending Corp., 815 F.3d 121,128 (2dCir. 2016).
42 U.S.C. § 198la(c) (2012).
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restrict a judge's ability to replace a jury's verdict with her own opinion of
the case. 80
There is an additional reason to be concerned about improper factfinding
at summary judgment and on appeal. When trial judges rule on summary
judgment motions or when appellate judges are considering an appeal, they
typically never see or hear the parties' witnesses. Instead, judges make their
decisions based on the record and the written material provide·d by each party
to support its case.
Despite these rules, the disbelief doctrines impermissibly allow a court
to believe the employer, not the worker. For example, when a court invokes
the same decisionmaker doctrine, it is claiming that because a decisionmaker
once took a positive action in favor of the worker, the same decisionmaker
could not have taken a protected trait into account when later making a
negative decision. Likewise, when a court invokes the same protected class
doctrine, the idea is that an individual would not discriminate against a group
of people with whom he or she shares one or more protected traits.
In many cases, it is not clear why these inferences are logical. If a
supervisor hires a woman for one job and then fails to promote her, bias could
have played a role in the promotion decision. The glass ceiling metaphor
suggests that some people think women are qualified for some lower-level
jobs, but not jobs with higher levels of responsibility. In another example, a
supervisor might have hired a woman who appeared to fit within certain sex
stereotypes during an interview, but then later discover that the worker acts
differently than the supervisor expected. For instance, a supervisor who
believes that women should be deferential may be initially pleased with a
female employee who was deferential during the interview, but disappointed
when she was not as deferential in the day-to-day job. The supervisor could
also be responding to pressures from others. For example, the supervisor
might not have thought about a person's protected class when hiring, but then
receives pressure from others about the new hire's race, sex, age, or other
trait. This internal pressure might cause the supervisor to later make a
negative decision related to the new hire.
In the same protected class context, there are many reasons that a
supervisor might discriminate against a worker in the same class. The
supervisor might have the same biases, but believe that they do not apply to
the supervisor. For example, a 55-year old supervisor might not think of
himself as old, but views other 60 year-olds as old. Likewise, a supervisor
may share the same trait as a worker, but there may be differences within the
trait itself. For example, a supervisor who is Catholic may discriminate
against other Catholics who hold more or less orthodox beliefs than the
supervisor.

80.

FED. R. CIV. P. 5O(a}-(b), 56(a).
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The stray remarks doctrine exhibits similar problems. If a supervisor
makes a comment six months before firing a worker that she is "too old to do
the job," it is not clear why the passage of six months erases the probative
value of the comment to show bias.
Whenever a judge invokes the same actor inference or the same
protected class inference in the following contexts, the judge is ignoring the
fundamental rules of litigation: ( 1) when ruling in favor of the employer on
a motion for summary judgment, (2) when ruling in the employer's favor on
a motion for judgment as a matter oflaw, (3) when deciding in the employer's
favor and contrary to the jury verdict to grant a renewed judgment as a matter
of law; and (4) when an appellate court nullifies a jury verdict in the
employee's favor. In many cases where judges invoke the stray remarks
doctrine and the super-personnel department justification, they are likewise
making credibility determinations and deciding whom to believe.
Harvard Law senior lecturer and then United States District Court Judge
Nancy Gertner indicated: "Whether a given remark is 'ambiguous'-whether
it connotes discriminatory animus or it does not-is precisely what a jury
should resolve, considering all of the facts in context. What may be
ambiguous to me, the judge, may not be to the plaintiff or to her peers." 81
Judge Gertner also noted the reasons that derogatory terms are potentially
powerful evidence of discrimination:
Introduced into evidence, ageist slurs, such as "old bag," "old shoe," or "old
pumpkin" may lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the speaker harbors
some animus towards a group of people, for example. And they might lead a
reasonable juror to further conclude that when that speaker is making a
decision concerning the employment of a member of the class about which
he holds a bias, he might actually be influenced by that bias. And finally,
apart from the speaker's animus, the statements that employers and
employees make in the workplace create an environment that may be hostile
in itself or an environment in which discriminatory employment decisions are
made and tolerated. 82

Despite this recognition, many judges continue to dismiss discriminatory
epithets as "stray remarks."
There are other reasons to be concerned about the stray remarks doctrine.
When judges use this doctrine, there is usually more evidence than just one
comment. Nonetheless, some judges isolate comments from the broader
context of the rest of the evidence in the case. 83

81.

Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319,335 (D. Mass. 2011 ).
Id. at 337.
83. See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App'x 529, 531 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and
remanded, 546 U.S. 454 (2006). See also Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate
Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577 (2001) (additional examples of the slicing and dicing phenomenon).
82.
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Importantly, the assumptions underlying the same actor and stray
remarks doctrines actually conflict. When judges use the same actor
inference, they are assuming that once a supervisor decides to hire someone
with a protected trait, that same person will not act in a discriminatory manner
when making other decisions about that person. In other words, the
supervisor's propensity not to discriminate will not change over time.
Yet, the stray remarks doctrine makes the opposite inference about
discrimination. If the supervisor discriminated in the past, he very well may
not discriminate in the future. 84 In Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized the tension between the
doctrines:
This case actually highlights an interesting linkage, or perhaps a disconnect,
between the cases using the "common actor" inference and cases dealing with
"stray remarks." The common actor inference says it is reasonable to assume
that if a person was unbiased at Time A (when he decided to hire the
plaintiff), he was also unbiased at Time B (when he fired the plaintiff). Again,
that is not a conclusive presumption, but we treat it as a reasonable inference.
Some "stray remarks" cases, though, seem to conclude that if a person was
racist or sexist at Time A (time of the remark), it is not reasonable to infer
that the person was still racist or sexist at Time B (when he made or
influenced the decision to fire the plaintiff). 85

Likewise, there is a similar tension between the stray remarks doctrine
and the breadth of information that courts will allow employers to submit in
support of their claim that they did not discriminate. Courts often make
judgment calls about when a potentially biased comment is too stale to show
discrimination. If a supervisor makes a discriminatory statement two years
prior to a negative action, for example, many courts will hold that this
statement is too far removed from the action to evince bias. 86 Yet, there is no
similar limit on the time period over which an employer can assert the
employee engaged in bad behavior, even if there is a time gap between the
poor performance and a later negative action. 87
And there is outright unfairness in the way that courts often invoke the
super-personnel department justification. Courts often allow employers to
support their non-discriminatory reason for acting by presenting the evidence
of co-workers, human resources personnel, and non-direct supervisors. For
example, if a worker has poor performance, the employer might submit the

84.
85.

Stone, supra note 3, at 183-84.
Perez v. Thomtons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 710 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (citations

omitted).
86.

See, e.g., Colom Gonzalez v. Black & Decker, PR, LLC., 193 F. Supp. 2d 419,422 (D.P.R.

2002).
87.
Paquin v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass 'n, 119 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting company could use
evaluations from several years); Cellucci v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 987 F. Supp. 2d 578, 592 (E.D. Pa. 2013)
(noting the employee had poor performance for years).
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testimony of co-workers supporting the supervisor's belief that the worker
performed poorly. However, when workers try to present evidence from coworkers or others that their performance was good, the courts often exclude
this evidence, citing the idea that the courts do not sit as super-personnel
departments. 88 This lack of analytical consistency regarding bias shows that
the disbelief doctrines are inherently structured to favor employers and
disfavor workers.
III.
STRUCTURAL CONCERNS

The disbelief doctrines raise three structural concerns. First, their use in
individual cases raises serious conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Second, it is unclear what authority the federal courts are invoking
to create the doctrines. Finally, the disbelief doctrines add to an already
confusing court-created jurisprudence. When judges use these doctrines at
proceduraljunctures, such as summary judgment, the analysis they undertake
is so different than how a jury would approach the case, that it is increasingly
difficult for judges to determine what a reasonable jury would decide.
If a federal judge invokes the same decisionmaker or the same protected
class inference to rule in favor of the employer at summary judgment, either
during trial or post-trial motions, or on appeal to nullify a jury verdict, it is
likely that the judge has violated the procedural rules that govern these steps
in the litigation process. These inferences tell the court to believe the
employer and not the worker, which thus facially violates Rules 50 and 56,
as well as rules that govern cases on appeal after a jury verdict. For example,
Rule 56 requires the court to draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. In an employment discrimination case, this is typically the employee,
not the employer. On appeal after a jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff, the
appellate court is supposed to construe the facts in favor of the plaintiff. In
many cases, the stray remarks doctrine, the honest belief doctrine, and rulings
made on the basis that courts do not sit as super-personnel departments suffer
from the same problems. I am advocating that each time a court invokes one
of these doctrines, when the judge is not sitting as the factfinder, the judge
should also separately examine whether her use of the doctrine comports with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The fact that judges in individual cases fail to follow the limits imposed
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is troublesome, but common. A
larger issue is whether the federal judiciary even possesses the power to
create these doctrines in the first place.

88. See, e.g., Montes v. Cicero Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 99, 141 F. Supp. 3d 885, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2015);
Weller v. Titanium Metals Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 712, 722 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
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Imagine that a federal judge created a rule in discrimination cases. The
rule provides as follows: "Whenever the employer presents evidence, always
believe it." Imagine that this is a court-created rule and that the judge applies
it whenever she is ruling on a summary judgment motion or a trial or posttrial motion. It is easy to see how it would be inappropriate for a judge to
create this rule because it directly contradicts Rules 56 and 50 and their
supporting doctrines. The rule also lacks any relation to the underlying statute
and cannot be justified under principles of statutory construction. In a sense,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve as a limit on judges' ability to
create some substantive law.
Yet, the disbelief doctrines often perform the same work as the
hypothetical rule I outlined above. Given the inherent tension between these
court-created disbelief doctrines and the basic rules that govern litigation, it
becomes necessary for the courts to explain from what source they derive
their power to create substantive rules that inherently contradict fundamental
notions about the proper role of the judge and the jury.
There is no arguable basis in the federal discrimination statutes' text,
purposes, or history to support either the same decisionmaker or same
protected class inferences. Indeed, as· discussed above, both of these
inferences appear to contradict existing Supreme Court precedent. In
justifying these doctrines, therefore, courts cannot rely on any claim about
statutory interpretation. Although some of the other doctrines may be valid
in a limited form, they cannot be justified in many instances. For example,
using the honest belief doctrine in a case where the employer claims the
worker violated a workplace rule is inappropriate where there is evidence that
the rule did not exist at the time, where it was not enforced in the past, or
where there is evidence that the employer had reason to doubt the employee
violated the rule. In each of these scenarios, there is evidence that the
employer's reason for acting is not the true reason for its decision.
The best argument in favor of these inferences is that the courts are
empowered to create rules necessary to administer statutes. However, such
an argument does not hold for very long. None of the doctrines discussed in
this article are necessary to carrying out the functions of the federal
discrimination statutes, and many of them contradict the core purpose of
these statutes, which is to provide workers with a remedy when they face
differential treatment at work because of a protected trait. Additionally, the
federal discrimination statutes explicitly instruct the courts when the
employer should have a defense to liability. For example, Title VII allows an
employer to discriminate based on certain protected classes if the class is a
bona fide occupational qualification. 89 Thus, the statutes already balance the

89.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (2012).
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interests of employers and workers. Adding additional rules that favor
employers throws off the balance already written into the statutory regime.
Even if courts could justify the disbelief doctrines as rules of
administration, it is unclear what power the courts have to create such rules
when they contradict the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example,
imagine that a court decided that to properly administer a statute, it needed
to create a rule abolishing summary judgment in that subset of cases. Such a
rule would be improper because it contradicts the pre-existing rule found in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The disbelief doctrines present the same
issue. When courts use the disbelief doctrines to believe or favor one party,
they contradict and undermine the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and for this reason are invalid.
The disbelief doctrines contribute to a larger problem with employment
discrimination jurisprudence: how far removed judge-made analysis is from
the analysis a jury would use if it were asked to decide the case. When a judge
is considering a summary judgment motion, the judge is supposed to consider
what a reasonable jury might decide given the disputed facts. However, the
complex, court-created doctrines that judges use to evaluate discrimination
cases frame cases in ways that are far different from how a jury would frame
them.
Imagine a case in which Billy, a 50-year-old, fires Tommy, who is 60
years old. Billy fires Tommy two years after he hired him. Tommy asserts
that on two occasions, when Tommy first started, Billy stated that older
women were "useless and just there to get paid." The employer asserts that
the reason Billy fired Tommy is that he violated a work rule relating to using
the Internet while on the job. No one has ever been fired for this before, but
Billy has also never caught anyone using the Internet at work before. Billy
believes that Tommy ordered a pair of shoes from Zappos during work hours.
However, Tommy claims that he switched his lunch hour that day and
ordered the shoes during lunch.
For a jury, this case likely revolves around credibility and motive. Does
the jury believe that Tommy violated a work rule? Does the jury believe that
Billy fired Tommy because he violated the rule, or was Billy simply trying
to get rid of Tommy because of his age? Do Billy's earlier comments about
older women show a bias against older workers generally? The essential
inquiries in this case are contested, fact specific, and involve credibility
determinations. This is exactly the kind of case that a court should allow a
jury to decide.
If the employer requests summary judgment in its favor, the judge will
not approach the case in the same way. Over the years, the courts have created
layers upon layers of legal analysis that judges use to evaluate cases at
summary judgment. The disbelief doctrines are one part of this complex
infrastructure.
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A judge approaching this case would most likely funnel it through the
McDonnell-Douglas test. In 1973, the Supreme Court decided the case of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 90 In that case, the Court first enunciated
the three-part burden-shifting framework that is now called the McDonnell
Douglas test. The Court held that a plaintiff proceeding on a disparate
treatment claim based on circumstantial evidence could prove his case
through a multi-part framework. The plaintiff is required to establish a prima
facie case by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications. 91

After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination arises. 92 The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the facts
required to establish a prima facie case will necessarily vary, depending on
the factual scenario of the underlying case. 93
After a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
allegedly discriminatory decision or action, thereby rebutting the
presumption. 94 The plaintiff is then provided the opportunity to show that the
employer's stated reason for the employment action was, in fact, pretext and
that the plaintiffs protected trait was the real reason for the decision. 95
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court
indicated that "the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment is not onerous." 96 According to the Court, the prima facie case
serves the function of "eliminat[ing] the most common nondiscriminatory
reasons for the plaintiffs rejection." 97 For example, in a failure to hire case,
the prima facie case should show that the employee possessed the minimum,
objective requirements for the job and that the employer was indeed hiring.
The Court further explained that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the
defendant is required to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its actions to rebut the presumption of discrimination. 98 The defendant's
burden, however, is one of production only. 99 After the defendant has
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

99.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
id. at 802.
See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1996).
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
id.
Id. at 804.
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981).
id. at 254.
id.
Id. at 255-56.
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articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason
for the employment decision. 100 The Court indicated that the plaintiff "may
succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 101 The Court
held, however, that the "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff." 102
In our age discrimination hypothetical, the summary judgment inquiry
will likely focus on whether Tommy can establish the prima facie case, which
in many modem iterations would require him to show that similarly situated
employees were treated differently. The court also will focus on whether
there is evidence that the employer's asserted reason is pretext.
The disbelief doctrines may also be a part of the judge's inquiry. The
judge may determine that Billy and Tommy are in the same protected class.
The judge may use the same decisionmaker inference, believing that Billy
hired Tommy just two years earlier and thus is unlikely to fire him because
of his age. The judge may also decide that the employer had an honest belief
that Tommy violated the work rule when Billy fired him.
Scholars have already noted the potential problems when judges place
themselves in the shoes of a reasonable jury. 103 Federal judges are appointed
by the President of the United States and have elite backgrounds and
credentials. Almost 75 percent of judges are men 104 and approximately 80
percent of them are white. 105 Juries, on the other hand, include people from
more diverse economic and cultural backgrounds. Thus, it is already difficult
for a judge to place himself or herself in the shoes of the reasonable jury.
What has received little attention, however, is how court-created
jurisprudence within the field of discrimination law also puts federal judges
in a completely different analytical frame of reference than the jury. The
jurisprudence makes it more difficult for a federal judge to determine what a
100.
IOI.
102.

Id.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 253.

103. Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 771-72 (2009);
Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe
Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL L. REV. 791, 795 (2002). See also Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in
Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge's Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671,671, 681-82
(2012-2013).
104.
Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER
2,
n.2
(Feb.
2016),
https://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07 /JudgesCourtsWomeninFedJudl 0.13.2016.pdf.
105.
Russell Wheeler, The Changing Face of the Federal Judiciary, GoVERNANCE STUDIES AT
BROOKINGS I (Aug. 2009), www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/8/federal-judiciarywheeler/08_federal_judiciary_ wheeler.pdf.
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reasonable jury might decide because the analytical structures that courts use
are so different from the way juries approach the same cases. Juries often are
not instructed to use the analytical frameworks used by judges, but rather
receive a broad instruction to determine whether a negative action occurred
because of a protected trait. 106 Judges often refuse to instruct juries on the
disbelief doctrines because they give improper weight to the defendant's
view of the facts. 107 Yet, judges continue to use these analytical frameworks
themselves to decide whether summary judgment is appropriate. Thus,
judges and juries may reach different answers because they are asking
different questions.
CONCLUSION

Disbelief doctrines are an important feature of discrimination
jurisprudence. Individually, these doctrines are problematic because many of
them are factually unsupported and they violate basic tenets around the
allocation of responsibility between judges and juries.
It is unclear whether the federal courts had the power to create the
disbelief doctrines in the first place. None of the doctrines is found within the
text of the federal discrimination statutes. The same decisionmaker and same
protected class doctrines cannot arguably be drawn from any reasonable
interpretation of the statutes. Many of the instances in which the courts
invoke the stray remarks doctrine, the honest belief rule, and the superpersonnel department concept are equally problematic. Finally, many of
these doctrines contradict Supreme Court precedent. They are in direct
tension with the basic rules that govern the proper roles of judges and juries,
and yet the courts have never explained under what authority they created
them.
Importantly, the disbelief doctrines add another layer to an already
complicated employment discrimination jurisprudence. These complex
doctrines are most often used by judges when deciding motions, such as a
motion for summary judgment. Most alarmingly, the court-created doctrines
used by judges are getting further and further removed from how a jury would
approach a discrimination case. As a consequence, when judges consider how
a reasonable jury would view the evidence, the existing jurisprudencewhich includes the disbelief doctrines-might lead those judges down
analytical paths that diverge from those chosen by a jury.
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See, e.g., Beard v. AAA of Michigan, 593 F. App'x 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting it is
typically improper to instruct a jury using McDonnell Douglas); Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,
197 F.3d 1322, 1333 (11th Cir. 1999) (declining to find error in trial court's decision not to instruct jury
on McDonnell Douglas framework). See also Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 4.5.
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See, e.g., McDole v. City of Saginaw, 471 F. App'x 464,476 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting no error
when district court did not give honest belief jury instruction); Jones v. Nat'I Am. Univ., 608 F.3d 1039,
1048 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding it would be duplicative to provide an honest belief instruction).

